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Punishing Reproductive Choices in the 
Name of Liberal Genetics 
ALEXANDER MORGAN CAPRON* 
When the four American moral philosophers who individually have 
already made the most significant contributions to the ethical analysis of 
contemporary health care and medicine collaborate, it should come as no 
surprise that their joint effort is a lucid and powerful analysis of the 
principles that a just and humane society would employ in setting 
policies about how the new tools of molecular genetics should be used for 
human betterment.  In From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice,1 
Allen Buchanan, Dan W. Brock, Norman Daniels, and Daniel Wikler aimed 
to steer a middle course between two extreme models.  The first model is 
what they termed the public health model, which measures good in terms of 
improving the genetic health of society.2  The second model is the 
personal services model, which measures good in the satisfaction of 
individual choices.3  Although the public health model led to the racist 
and classist eugenics that marred the Progressive Movement in the 
United States in the early decades of the twentieth century and then 
culminated in the crimes of Nazism,4 the reaction to those excesses 
created the present devotion to “nondirective genetic counseling” that 
produces excesses of personal autonomy.5  According to this excess of 
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 1. ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE 
(2000). 
 2. Id. at 11. 
 3. Id. at 12. 
 4. See id. at 30–40. 
 5. Nondirective genetic counseling is an educational process.  The patient or 
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personal autonomy, all choices are equally legitimate, without regard for 
justice or equality, and are no different than choices about any goods 
purchased in a marketplace.6 
In place of these extremes, the authors argued for a system of ethical 
principles to guide both individuals and institutions, thereby avoiding 
what they rightly described as ad hoc solutions to new developments.7  
Not surprisingly, much of their effort went into carefully defining terms 
and making the distinctions necessary for clear analysis, and I admire the 
care with which they built their arguments, principally in spelling out the 
implications of different concepts of justice for genetic interventions.8  
When it comes to applying their moral reasoning to social policies, 
however, I am not persuaded by the authors’ conclusions on several points, 
in part because they have not made all of the necessary distinctions.  To 
explore this issue, this Essay will focus on the authors’ arguments about 
reproductive freedom in chapter 6 that further illustrate the virtues as 
well as the limitations of their book.  This Essay focuses on the connections 
the authors made between moral principles and policy conclusions and, 
more generally, the civil, criminal, and regulatory law through which 
policy is given effect. 
The authors made three moves to begin their discussion of reproductive 
freedom.  First, the authors focussed on “issues raised by interventions to 
prevent genetically transmitted harms.”9  Second, they examined “the 
moral importance of reproductive freedom” rather than attempting to 
construct a moral right to reproductive freedom “in order to avoid the 
diversion of having to develop and defend a theory of moral rights.”10  
Because the authors were later willing to reason from moral interests to 
 
family is provided with the facts about the problem, such as diagnosis, prognosis, and 
identification of family members at risk.  The goal of self-determination is advanced 
from the start, and clients are encouraged to make their own choices without influence 
from the counselor’s personal value system.  Ruth L. Silverberg & Lynn Godmilow, The 
Process of Genetic Counseling, in COUNSELING IN GENETICS 283–84 (Y. Edward Hsia et 
al. eds., 1979). 
 6. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 13. 
 7. Id. at 13–14. 
 8. Though careful, the work is not free of errors.  For example, the authors stated 
that the Human Genome Project seeks to determine the sequence of three million base 
pairs, Id. at 5, although three billion is more accurate.  Mark S. Boguski, Hunting for 
Genes in Computer Data Bases (Molecular Medicine), 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 645, 648 
(1995).  The authors also derived a homozygous rate for hereditary hemochromatosis of 
4:1000 from a carrier rate of 1:10.  BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 8.  Actually, when 
one person in ten is heterozygous, the result is one homozygote per 400 births, while 
4:1000 implies a carrier rate of 1:8.  Lastly, the authors called Huntington’s disease by 
the outdated term “Huntington’s chorea,” Id. at 230, which only refers to one distinctive 
symptom of the disease.  Joseph B. Martin & James F. Gusella, Huntington’s Disease: 
Pathogenesis and Management, 315 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1267, 1267 (1986). 
 9. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 206. 
 10. Id. at 207. 
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legal rights and obligations, their reluctance to develop a full-blown theory 
of moral rights does not impede their conclusions.  Third, the authors 
applied the conventional distinction between negative and positive 
freedoms to the reproductive sphere.11  Though the authors suggested that 
such freedoms are usually correlative,12 they argued that sometimes it may 
be wrong to interfere with a negative component of reproductive freedom, 
such as preventing an individual from accessing relevant genetic 
information, without it also being wrong to fail to enable the individual to 
obtain such information.13 
This framework of analysis seems entirely justifiable, but it leaves one 
basic issue unexplored: does reproductive freedom attach to people as 
individuals or only as part of a pair?  The authors appear at odds with 
themselves on this point.  For example, the first component of reproductive 
freedom is “uncoerced choice about whether to procreate at all, or, more 
precisely, whether to participate in procreative activity with a willing 
partner.”14  It seems that individuals have what might be termed an 
incomplete freedom, while the complete version of reproductive freedom 
attaches only to male and female pairs.15  That is, individuals have a 
reproductive interest both in not being deprived of whatever ability they 
possess to procreate and in having access to the information needed to 
exercise that ability in an informed fashion, such as by obtaining 
accurate results of genetic tests.  However, this version of reproductive 
freedom is incomplete because it does not include any moral claim on 
being able to reproduce in the absence of agreement of another 
individual who also possesses the same freedom.  Two conclusions 
follow from this distinction.  First, individuals do not have a claim, 
either in positive or negative terms, to become biological parents in the 
absence of a willing partner.  This amounts to a strong reading of what 
the authors meant when they wrote about what is more precisely 
 
 11. Id. at 208. 
 12. Id. 
 13. An example would come about when “some very expensive genetic intervention” 
is of too great cost and too limited benefit to justify making it “available at public 
expense to anyone who wants it.”  Id. 
 14. Id. at 209. 
 15. Two clarifications may be in order.  First, this premise has no implication 
regarding individuals’ ability to become or to function as parents outside of a male and 
female pair (parenting not being the same as reproducing).  Second, this premise is based 
on existing methods of human reproduction, which are all sexual, whatever the future 
possibilities of asexual reproduction. 
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involved in reproductive freedom.16  Second, reproductive freedom entails 
the full and continuing exercise of choice by both members of the pair to 
reproduce, so that the present unwillingness or inability of either 
individual to consent removes the mantle of reproductive freedom from 
the act of the other.  Examples of this include a woman seeking to have 
sperm extracted from the testes of her recently deceased fiancé who never 
expressed the desire for her to become pregnant by him posthumously, 
and a man seeking access to frozen embryos created with gametes from 
himself and his ex-wife who does not want to have children by him. 
In some ways, this insistence on the nature of reproductive freedom is 
perhaps more central to the authors’ discussion of genetic enhancement 
in chapter 7 because this view provides a means of drawing a line 
between actions that are within parents’ reproductive freedom and those 
that fall outside that realm.  Yet it is also useful to begin by locating 
reproductive freedom within this dyadic model because doing so serves 
as a reminder that we are not dealing with the fulfillment of a single 
individual’s wishes, but rather with a project that involves accommodation 
of another person’s wishes.  Of course, the choices made by the couple 
may still be portrayed, as the authors suggest, as embodying a radical, 
even market-oriented, version of autonomy.17  However, as I will further 
explore in a moment, if we move from abstractions to the world of actual 
decisions, made by human beings in relationship to other human beings, 
the reality of negotiation with, and even deference to, the wishes and 
needs of another person that characterize most real exercises of 
reproductive choice is much more complex than the language of 
autonomy might imply.  This Essay does not mean in the least to 
denigrate the authors’ fine statement of the range of choices 
encompassed within reproductive freedom18 or their catalogue of the 
interests and values that determine the moral importance of reproductive 
freedom.19  Yet the latter, which are framed in individualist terms, take 
on a somewhat different cast if they are read through the dyadic lenses 
here proposed.  In other words, while we can regard things such as the 
choice to have or to not have children in purely individualistic terms, 
most reproductive decisions, and all those that involve creating children 
as opposed to avoiding them, involve two people in some relationship to 
 
 16. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 209. 
 17. Id. at 13. 
 18. These choices include whether to procreate, with whom, by what means, when to 
procreate, how many children to have, what kind of children to have, and whether to have 
biologically related children.  Id. at 209–11.  It is surprising, however, to see “access to new 
reproductive techniques,” with no qualification of which techniques might be encompassed, 
simply assumed to be part of “procreative activity with a willing partner,” without 
discussion or justification.  Id. at 209. 
 19. Id. at 214–22. 
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each other and to their joint project in which the most extreme forms of 
individualism are inevitably mitigated.20  For example, a woman achieving 
pregnancy through artificial insemination with sperm from an 
anonymous, yet still consenting, man would be an extreme form of 
individualism, but mitigated by the fact that consent from the donor was 
still achieved in some way. 
This real world context is vitally important in analyzing the major 
effort that the authors undertook in chapter 5, namely to construct a basis 
for overriding the reproductive choices of parents that would otherwise 
produce children whose lives would be overwhelmingly burdened by a 
genetic condition.21  The case that the authors made for preventing the 
occurrence of these conditions is a powerful one.  It is pleasing to find 
that their philosophical dissection of the so-called wrongful life cases 
supports the criticism that I have raised to judicial refusal to allow such 
suits by children against physicians or other healthcare providers whose 
wrongful failure to provide necessary information to parents resulted in 
the children being born with serious genetic diseases.22  Courts and 
commentators objecting to such suits have argued that wrongs may not 
occur before a legal person exists,23 that the genetic condition was 
inherent in the child’s existence,24 or that harm cannot be measured in 
terms of the diminution from a normal condition that the child would 
otherwise have enjoyed.25  The authors demonstrated that none of these 
 
 20. Of course, in some cases the relationship itself is attenuated, and certain acts of 
reproduction in this context have a large measure of singular individualism about them, 
such as a single individual attempting to have a child without seeking approval from 
someone of the opposite sex, for example, a single woman using a sperm bank. 
 21. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 181–96. 
 22. Alexander Morgan Capron, Informed Decisionmaking in Genetic Counseling: 
A Dissent to the “Wrongful Life” Debate, 48 IND. L.J. 581 (1973) (arguing that in 
genetic counseling, the parents have a legal right to be fully informed decisionmakers 
about whether to have a child; and, likewise, the genetic counselor has the duty to 
convey to those he advises a clear and comprehensible picture of the options open to 
them, the relative risks and benefits, and the foreseeable consequences of each one); 
Alexander Morgan Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618 
(1979) (highlighting early uncertainty in the field of genetic counseling, and the resulting 
legal liabilities the job entails). 
 23. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 236. 
 24. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967) (stating that for purposes 
of measuring damages, the plaintiff is required to say not that he should have been born 
without defects but rather that he should not have been born at all); see also BUCHANAN 
ET AL., supra note 1, at 236. 
 25. Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Mo. 1988) (denying the plaintiff’s 
claims because of difficulties in calculating damages created by the necessity of comparing 
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objections stand in the way of a coherent statement that the child has 
suffered a moral wrong.26 
However, it is at this point that I disagree with the authors’ conclusion 
that parents, rather than only healthcare professionals, can be held liable 
for such a wrong.27  The authors seemed concerned with preventing 
harm, which implies some sort of injunctive measure.  Such a measure 
would apparently include a temporary or even permanent prevention of 
conception, or abortion of an existing, affected fetus.28  The authors 
recognized that another way to achieve the desired result would be, as in 
child abuse laws, to threaten to punish violations criminally.29  If this 
were allowed, the lesser punishment of civil suits for damages would 
also appear legitimate.  Thus, the reader may be excused a sense of 
amazement when, after all this hinting that their development of a moral 
right is intended to buttress public policy, the authors suddenly 
proclaimed: “[w]rongful life conceptions are sufficiently uncommon, 
and practical and moral difficulties in using the coercive power of 
government to prevent them sufficiently great, to rule out policies that 
prevent people from conceiving wrongful lives. Coercive government 
intrusion into reproductive freedom to prevent wrongful life would be 
wrong.”30  Frankly, it is not clear from this statement whether the 
authors meant to allow after-the-fact remedies which stop short of forced 
sterilization or abortion.  Fines and civil damages can, after all, be 
conceived as placing a price on certain choices without necessarily 
coercing people into behaving differently.  Or perhaps, having seen 
where their moral arguments would take them, the authors wished 
suddenly to abandon what otherwise seems to be an exercise in practical, 
as opposed to purely abstract, philosophy.  Whichever reading is correct, 
this Essay will now expand on why the authors were right to conclude 
that the law ought not to treat parental choices to give birth to a child 
with a genetic problem as the basis for either criminal or civil action.31  
Additionally, this Essay expands upon why this conclusion casts doubt 
on the authors’ underlying conclusion that parents who go forward with 
 
impaired life with nonexistence); see also BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 234. 
 26. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 226–56. 
 27. Id. at 237. 
 28. The authors stated that it would be “virtually never morally justified,” which 
assumably means that it would be justified in extreme cases.  Id. at 241.  From the 
viewpoint of public acceptance, forced abortion seems no more likely, however, than the 
alternative that the authors find morally preferable, “withholding life support even over 
[the child’s] parents’ objections,” though they do recognize that it would not conceivably 
be acceptable as a matter of policy.  Id. 
 29. Id. at 237, 240. 
 30. Id. at 242. 
 31. Id. 
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reproduction under these circumstances have committed something that 
the rest of us should label a moral wrong.32 
There are at least four reasons for doubting the conclusion that parents 
commit a moral wrong in these circumstances.  First, the category of 
harms is too ill-defined.  The authors distinguished conditions that make 
life not worth living, which they called wrongful life, from those that 
burden life but do not outweigh its worth, which they called wrongful 
disability.33  The imprecision of this distinction is a fatal defect.  The 
authors’ application of non-person-affecting principles34 led them to 
conclude that the child born with wrongful disabilities has not been 
harmed, even if it is wrong for the parent to have produced that child.35  
Plainly, in both criminal and civil terms, the consequences of these two 
wrongs would be very different.  In these circumstances, it is not enough 
simply to admit that there is no precise line for what counts as a burden 
that is morally wrong to impose.  Indeed, the very examples that the 
authors use, Lesch-Nyhan disease and Tay-Sachs disease, demonstrate 
this point.36  While the self-mutilation involved in Lesch-Nyhan disease 
seems Jobian in its horror, the lack of awareness of self-suffering that 
seems to characterize the neurological collapse of infants affected by Tay-
Sachs disease would lead many people to say that the latter is a condition 
that is nearly unbearable for the child’s parents rather than for the child. 
Second, while chapter 2 of the book makes clear the dangers of 
eugenics,37 the whole decision to set up a category of genetic conditions 
as special instances of parental wrongdoing singles out genetics and 
 
 32. Id. at 237. 
 33. Id. at 225. 
 34. See id. at 227. 
 35. Id. at 226 (claiming that in wrongful disability cases, while standard accounts 
of harm cannot be applied, those accounts can be revised or extended to fit the 
circumstances of wrongful disabilities; and that wrongful disability cases do in fact 
constitute serious moral wrongs). 
 36. Id. at 233.  See generally William L. Nyhan & Dean F. Wong, New Approaches to 
Understanding Lesch-Nyhan Disease, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1602, 1603 (1996) (“The 
neurological features of Lesch-Nyhan disease include delayed motor development, 
severe spasticity, opisthotonos, and choreic, athetoid, or dystonic movements.  The 
characteristic behavior is . . . aggressive, compulsive, and self-injurious.  In these 
patients, the most typical feature is loss of tissue from biting themselves, even though 
they are not insensitive to pain.”); ATTORNEYS’ TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE ¶ 17.21(3) 
(Roscoe N. Gray & Louise J. Gordy eds., 3d. ed. 2002) (Stating that symptoms of Tay-
Sachs disease “begin in infancy and include hypotonia, progressive loss of vision, loss of 
interest in surroundings, and loss of attained milestones, with death occurring at about 
the age of 4”). 
 37. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 30–40. 
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opens the backdoor to eugenic reasoning.  If we are really concerned 
with harms to children, then focusing solely on genetic harms would 
seem merely precious if it did not also amount to a diversion from what 
ought to be our greater concern—harms that are not prevented because 
of parental ignorance or lack of access to basic healthcare services.  The 
simple picture of cause and effect that makes genetic diseases so easy to 
understand38 also makes genetic diseases easier to deal with as a policy 
matter than the complex relationship between living conditions, 
nutrition, education, and other aspects of the welfare of prospective 
parents and the health status of their offspring. 
Third, the authors acknowledged that most prospective parents who are 
provided with information about either their own genetic risks in 
reproducing or a serious genetic condition affecting their fetus would want 
to act in the best interests of their future child.39  Having said this, the 
authors then aimed their critique at the hypothetical parents who 
“evidence little concern for their children’s well-being”40 and give birth to 
children with very serious burdens.41  Think for a moment, however, about 
this issue the authors raise.  Unless the discussion has been arbitrarily 
confined to people who act while they are decisionally impaired, we 
would, in the model of nondirective counseling of which the authors are 
so critical,42 be talking about people who decided to go ahead with a 
pregnancy having been informed about everything their genetic advisors 
could tell them concerning the probability of harm, the nature of the harm, 
the degree of the harm, and the degree to which the harm could be 
remediated after birth.  If the parents proceeded, it would seem to me that, 
rather than label them moral wrongdoers, it is more reasonable to describe 
them as people who give different weights to the factors involved.  These 
could include people who regard the life as one that may be severely 
disabled, in the way the authors use the term,43 but with compensating 
benefits that make it still worth living.44  Furthermore, the range of parents 
caught up in this process, and hence the number likely to reach a different 
 
 38. It is easy to understand until we begin to appreciate the huge variability that 
attaches to most genetic conditions, and the complex patterns of multifactorial and 
multigenic causation. 
 39. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 256. 
 40. Id. at 257. 
 41. The authors also suggested that some parents do not act in their children’s best 
interests, “because there are genuine and unavoidable conflicts of interest between 
parents and their children,” yet the authors offer the reader no clue about what category 
of interests (beyond reproductive freedom) they have in mind.  Id. 
 42. Silverberg & Godmilow, supra note 5, at 283–84. 
 43. Id. at 285–87. 
 44. Referring to benefits such as curb breaks to make streets navigable for those in 
wheelchairs, ramps so that these individuals can enter public buildings, Braille signs in 
elevators, and so forth.  Id. 
FINALCAPRON.DOC 2/11/2020  11:48 AM 
[VOL. 39:  683, 2002]  Punishing Reproductive Choices 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 691 
view than the experts regarding moral behavior is certain to increase with 
increases in genetic technology.  After all, a few years ago none of these 
parents would have been said to have committed a moral wrong because 
the means to diagnose and to treat these genetic conditions prenatally did 
not exist.  Are parents who reject these means of treatment, including 
contraception, abortion, or preconceptual or prenatal genetic manipulation, 
now running the risk of being judged unfit? 
A final reason for being skeptical about a moral, much less a legal, 
basis for claiming that parents commit a wrong emerges when we 
remember the concept of wrongful life.  In 1963, the Illinois Court of 
Appeals rejected the notion that children should ever be permitted to 
claim that their parents had wronged them because of the 
circumstances of their birth.45  In Zepeda v. Zepeda, the court explicitly 
hypothesized that beyond palpable medical burdens, some children 
could reasonably claim that they were given a poor start in life by their 
parents’ lack of wealth or income, by their parents’ race or ethnicity, or 
by their parents’ other characteristics that proved to be inherited by the 
children, such as being ugly, or slow, or stupid.46  Subsequent courts 
misapplied the Zepeda holding by extending this wrongful life doctrine 
to insulate physicians and other professionals from liability.47  This 
extension is not appropriate because healthcare professionals do have 
an affirmative duty of care toward the children that is breached when 
the children’s parents are not given relevant information.48  
Nonetheless, the Zepeda court was right in saying that were one to 
establish the principle that parents owe their children any particular 
start in life, one would have opened the door to an endlessly expansive 
duty.49   
The question for the authors, then, is whether, in light of chapter 6, 
they would be comfortable with the implication of that duty, which 
would require the use of measures to improve genetic fitness and not 
merely to avoid genetic unfitness.  It would be ironic if a work that is 
 
 45. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963). 
 46. Id. at 858. 
 47. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967); Berman v. Allan, 
404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979); Williams v. State, 223 N.E.2d 343 (N.Y. 1966). 
 48. Santana v. Zilog, Inc., 95 F.3d 780, 786 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Generally, wrongful 
birth imposes liability for breach of a physician’s duty of care to ensure that parents can 
make an informed decision with respect to their right to prevent birth or conception of 
children.”). 
 49. See Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d at 858. 
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as sensitive to the harms caused by past eugenic abuses provided a 
rationale for mandating a more far-reaching modern version of eugenics 
under the banner of reproductive freedom. 
 
